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Abstract
This Comment analyzes the impact of landmine use on civilians, the effect of international
law on landmine warfare, and the proposed changes to international law in response to the harm
inflicted upon civilians. The Comment concludes that the United Nations Review Conference will
not adopt a total ban on the production, use, transfer, and stockpiling of landmines, and therefore
will fail in its efforts to protect civilians.
THE LANDMINE REVIEW CONFERENCE: WILL




Protocol III ("Landmine Protocol") of the 1980 Convention
on Conventional Weapons2 ("CCW") was designed to protect ci-
vilians from the devastating effects of landmines.' Fifteen years
later, the daily lives of civilians in more than sixty countries
throughout Africa, Asia, Europe, and Latin America continue to
be threatened and impeded by the existence of over 100 million
emplaced landmines.4 The Landmine Protocol has failed to
protect civilians, and as a result, the civilian injury and death
tolls have mounted.5
* J.D. Candidate, 1996, Fordham University. The Author gratefully acknowledges
the assistance provided by Kenneth Anderson, General Counsel, The Soros
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1. Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and
Other Devices (Protocol II), Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of
Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or
to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Apr. 10, 1981, 1342 U.N.T.S. 137, 168, 19 I.L.M 1523,
1529 [hereinafter CCW].
2. Id. There are three Protocols attached to the CCW. Id. Protocol I prohibits the
use of weapons that cause injury by fragments that cannot be detected in the human
body by X-rays. Protocol on Non-Detectable Fragments (Protocol I), CCW, supra note
1, 1342 U.N.T.S. at 168, 19 I.L.M. at 1529. Protocol III is concerned with the use of
incendiary weapons. Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the use of Incendiary
Weapons (Protocol III), CCW, supra note 1, 1342 U.N.T.S. 171, 19 I.L.M. at 1534.
3. CCW, supra note 1, Protocol II, art. 3(2)-(3), 1342 U.N.T.S. at 169, 19 I.L.M. at
1530. The Landmine Protocol forbids the use of landmines that are directed at civil-
ians, either directly, or in a way that does not or cannot be directed at a military objec-
tive. Id. Landmines kill and maim about 26,000 people a year, mostly civilians. U.S.
DEP'T STATE, BUREAU OF POLITICAL-MILrrARY AFFAIRS, HIDDEN KILLERS: THE GLOBAL
LANDMINE CISIS 1 (1994) [hereinafter HIDDEN KILLERS]. The presence of large quanti-
ties of landmines affects entire ways of life, especially the economies and infrastructure,
of persons living in mined territories. Paul Jefferson, Technical Aspects of Anti-Personnel
Mines, in SympOsiuM ON ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES 103, 105 (International Committee of
the Red Cross ed., 1993) [hereinafter MONTREUX SYMPOSIUM] (ICRC symposium of
landmine experts regarding anti-personnel mines).
4. HIDDEN KILLERS, supra note 3, at 56.
5. State Department Special Briefing, Federal News Service, Jan. 27, 1995, available in
LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File (recounting briefing by Assistant Secretary of State
Thomas McNamara stating that landmine problem is getting worse); seeJack H. McCall,
Jr., Infernal Machines and Hidden Death: International Law and Limits on the Indiscriminate
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A movement toward a ban on the use, production, stockpil-
ing, and transfer of mines ("total ban") has been gaining mo-
mentum for several years.6 The proponents of a total ban be-
lieve that partial bans and restrictions on the use of landmines
cannot effectively control what has been called a "global
landmine crisis."7 Many countries, however, whose military lead-
ers believe that landmines are essential for their combat needs,
oppose the movement toward a total ban.'
From September 25 to October 13, 1995, the United Na-
tions will host a conference in Vienna to review the CCW ("Re-
view Conference").' The countries participating in the Review
Conference will examine the CCW, including the Landmine
Protocol, and decide how this document should be altered, if at
all, to respond to the crisis.10 In preparation for the Review Con-
Use of Land Mine Warfare, 24 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 229 (1994) (describing magnitude
of problem and failure of Landmine Protocol).
6. Richard Falk, Walking the Tightrope of International Humanitarian Law: Meeting the
Challenge of Land Mines, in CLEAING THE FIELDS 69 (Kevin M. Cahill ed., 1995); Report of
the Final Experts Meeting, supra note 10, annex I, art. 3(10), at 5 (making total ban ulti-
mate goal of amended Landmine Protocol).
7. Testimony May 13, 1994, Kenneth Anderson Director Arms Project of Human Rights
Watch, Senate Appropriations/Foreign Operations FY95 Foreign Operations Appropriations -
Global Landmine Crisis, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (May 13, 1994), available in LEXIS, News
Library, CURNWS File [hereinafter Anderson Testimony] (explaining that total ban is
necessary for monitoring and enforcing landmine restrictions).
8. Report of the International Committee of the Red Cross for the Review Conference of the
1980 United Nations Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conven-
tional Weapons which may be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Ef-
fects, 299 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 123, 178 (Mar.-Apr. 1994) [hereinafter ICRC Report]I. A
symposium of military experts concluded that no alternative meets the military require-
ments of landmines. Id.
9. Progress Report of the Group of Governmental Experts to Prepare the Review Conference of
the States Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conven-
tional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate
Effects, 3d Sess., [ 14, at 7, U.N. Doc. CCW/Conf.I/GE/21 (1994) [hereinafter Report of
the Third Experts Meeting].
10. HIDDEN KILLERS, supra note 3, at 2; CCW, supra note 1, art. 8(3)(a), 1342
U.N.T.S. at 167, 19 I.L.M. at 1528. Article 8 of the CCW authorizes a Review Confer-
ence after ten years of the Convention being in force. Id. All states parties are invited
to the Review Conference. Group of Governmental Experts to Prepare the Review Conference of
the States Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conven-
tional Weapons which may Be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Ef-
fects, Fourth Sess., annex III, rule 1, at 1, U.N. Doc. CCW/Conf.I/GE/23 (1995) [here-
inafter Report of the Final Experts Meeting]. States which are not parties are invited as
observers. Id. As of the January 1995 meeting, the states parties were: Australia, Aus-
tria, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Fin-
land, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Japan, Latvia, Mexico, the Nether-
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ference, Governmental Experts Meetings, held by the United
Nations, have produced reports containing proposals that will
control the subject matter to be considered by the delegates par-
ticipating in the Review Conference.l"
This Comment analyzes the impact of landmine use on civil-
ians, the effect of international law on landmine warfare, and
the proposed changes to international law in response to the
harm inflicted upon civilians. Part I describes the impact of
landmine warfare on civilians, and examines the regulation of
landmines by international law. Part II describes the response of
the international community by presenting the resulting propos-
als of the Governmental Experts Meetings. Part III argues that
the proposals of the Governmental Experts Meetings fail to ade-
quately address the global landmine crisis, and that while partial
bans may save lives and help maintain the momentum toward
tighter controls, these proposals can be dangerous and counter-
productive if seen as solutions rather than steps toward a total
ban. This Comment concludes that the Review Conference will
not adopt a total ban on the production, use, transfer, and stock-
piling of landmines, and therefore will fail in its efforts to pro-
tect civilians.
I. THE GLOBAL LANDMINE CRISIS
Landmines affect the daily lives of civilians around the
globe. 12 Historically, conventional armies used landmines de-
fensively, which minimized the damage done to civilians. 13 In
the last twenty-five years, however, the nature of landmine war-
fare has changed. 4 Today, guerilla forces,15 less concerned
lands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Poland, the Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slove-
nia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and Ukraine. Id. 1 2, at 1. The states non-parties who
participated in the January meeting as observers were: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola,
Argentina, Belgium, Brazil, Cambodia, Chile, Colombia, Ethiopia, Iran, Ireland, Israel,
Italy, Kenya, Kuwait, Nicaragua, Peru, Portugal, the Republic of Korea, Romania, South
Africa, Syria, Turkey, Great Britain, and the United States. Id.
11. Report of the Final Experts Meeting, supra note 10, annex III, rule 29, at 6. Rule 29
of the Draft Rules of Procedure to be followed by the Review Conference establishes
that the draft proposals submitted to the Conference by the Group of Governmental
Experts will be the proposals to be considered by the Conference. Id.
12. HIDDEN KILLERS, supra note 3, at 1.
13. Cyrus Vance & Herbert S. Okun, Eliminating the Threat of Land Mines: A'New
U.S. Policy, in CLEARING THE FIELDS 198, 199 (Kevin M. Cahill ed., 1995).
14. Id.
15. Rae McGrath, The Reality of the Present Use of Mines ly Militay Force, in MoN-
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about the consequences to civilians, use landmines more exten-
sively and less responsibly, increasing the damage to civilians. 16
The Landmine Protocol was designed to protect civilians from
landmine warfare. 7
A. The Magnitude of the Landmine Crisis
The U.S. Department of State estimates that 500.people are
maimed or killed by landmines every week.1 8 Eighty percent of
landmine victims are civilians, 9 and many are children.2 0 Cam-
bodia is an example of a country particularly devastated by
landmines, where one out of every 236 persons is missing an arm
or a leg.2' In Africa, where nearly half of the countries have
landmine problems, over 12,000 people die each year. 2
In addition to the humanitarian costs, the economic costs of
landmines are also enormous.23 The total cost of clearing all of
the mines laid throughout the world is estimated to be US$33
billion.2 ' After the Gulf War fighting ceased in Kuwait, the
Kuwaiti government spent $US700 million to clear mines, and
more than eighty deminers died in the effort.25 Most countries
infested with landmines lack the resources to embark on such a
costly demining effort.26 While mines may cost as little as US$3
TREux SYMPOSIUM, supra note 3, at 7, 9. Insurgents, guerrillas, or terrorists are all terms
that have been used to describe forces that use landmines in ways considered less ac-
ceptable, or more illegal, than the conventional armies involved in conflicts. Id. Some
conventional armies have, as in the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, used mines in the
same manner as the insurgents. Id. Military experts, gathered at a symposium to study
the military use of landmines, "felt that there was a need to distinguish between conven-
tional warfare, which is generally carried out in international armed conflicts where
classical contemporary military doctrine prevails and where trained and disciplined
soldiers are engaged, and civil war and counter-insurgency operations, where these con-
ditions are seldom met." ICRC Rport, supra note 8, at 171.
16. ICRC Report, supra note 8, at 173.
17. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (describing purpose of Landmine Pro-
tocol).
18. HIDDEN KILLERS, supra note 3, at 2.
19. Vance & Okun, supra note 13, at 199.
20. ICRC Report, supra note 8, at 159.
21. Jody Williams, Social Consequences of Wespread Use of Landmines, in MoNTrrux
SYMPOSIUM, supra note 3, at 69, 75.
22. HIDDEN KILLERS, supra note 3, at 1.
23. Id. at 13-14.
24. Patrick Worsnip, U.S. Sees No Hope of BanningMines Soon, Reuters,Jan. 27, 1995,
available in LEXIS, News library, CURNWS File.
25. HIDDEN KILLERS, supra note 3, at 21.
26. Id. at 1.
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each, they can cost up to US$1000 each to clear.2 1
The characteristics of landmines present unique humanita-
rian concerns.2 8 Because landmines do not explode until their
victims approach, 29 a mine cannot be aimed at a specific target,
and the dangers posed by landmines do not diminish rapidly.3 °
Mines remaining from World War II kill or injure about twelve
people a year in the Netherlands.31 According to the Interna-
tional Committee for the Red Cross ("ICRC"), it would take 4000
years to clear the mines already laid in Cambodia.12 The major-
ity of the mines throughout the world were emplaced during the
last fifteen years,33 and presently, mines are being laid much
faster than they are being cleared.34 In the former Yugoslavia
alone, an estimated three million mines were laid between 1991
and 1994.35
B. How Landmines Are Used
Because of their time-delayed characteristics, landmines are
weapons with indiscriminate effects.3 6 When landmines were
27. Id.
28. Lieutenant Colonel Burris M. Carnahan, The Law of Land Mine Warfare: Protocol
II to the United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, 105 MIL. L. REV. 73, 82
(1984).
29. Id. at 75.
30. Brigadier A.P.V. Rogers, The Mines Protocol Negotiating History, in MONTREUX
SymPOSiUM, supra note 3, at 227; Anderson Testimony, supra note 7.
31. David A. Bloom, Land Mines Keep Wars From Ever Coming to an End, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR, Feb. 16, 1995, at 19; Vance & Okun, supra note 13, at 202.
32. John Young, Red Cross Urges Ban to Stop Landmine Carnage, Times, Dec. 29, 1994,
available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.
33. HIDDEN KILLERS, supra note 3, at v.
34. STATEMENT By THE DIRECTOR OF INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION, UNHCR, TO THE
REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE STATE PARTIES TO THE CONVENTION ON PROHIBITIONS OR
RESTRICTIONS ON THE USE OF CERTAIN CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS WHICH MAY BE DEEMED
TO BE EXCESSIVELY INJURIOUS OR TO HAVE INDISCRIMINATE EFFECTS (Geneva, May 20,
1994) (available from United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees). Each year
80,000 mines are removed by coordinated efforts, while two million are laid by warring
factions. Id. at 4.
35. Testimony May 13, 1994, Patrick Leahy Senator, Senate Appropriations/Foreign Opera-
tions FY 95 Foreign Operations Appropriations - Global Landmine Crisis, 103d Cong., 2d Sess.
(May 13, 1994), available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.
36. Anderson Testimony, supra note 7. The Landmine Protocol definition of "indis-
criminate use" is the use of a landmine:
(a) which is not on, or directed against, a military objective; or
(b) which employs a method or means of delivery which cannot be directed at
a specific military objective; or
(c) which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to
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primarily used by conventional armies, the impact of landmine
warfare on civilians was less severe. 7 Armed forces during con-
ventional wars such as World War II and the Korean War used
landmines in a limited and specific manner.38 But the nature of
warfare has changed during the past quarter of a century.3 9 To-
day, landmine use is pervasive, and the parties using them are
less "responsible" than ever before.40
1. The Nature of Modem Landmine Warfare
Military leaders regard landmines as an integral part of a
battlefield plan.41 A symposium of military leaders concluded
that other methods of warfare are unable to accomplish the
same objectives in as cost-effective and efficient a manner.42 The
main purposes of landmines for conventional armies are to deny
access to areas, to channel enemy forces so that they are more
civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which
would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advan-
tage anticipated."
CCW, supra note 1, Protocol II, art. 3, 1342 U.N.T.S. at 169, 19 1.L.M. at 1530-31.
37. THE ARMS PROJECT & PHYSIIANS FOR HuMAN RIGHTS, LANDMINES" A DEADLY
LEGACY 270 (1993). The threshold of the traditional balancing test of humanitarian
and military concerns is much more easily passed in favor of the military when the
mines were being used primarily by conventional armies for defensive purposes. Id.
For a book review of Landmrines: A Deadly Legacy, see Morris Panner, Book Review:
Landmines: A Deadly Legacy, 17 FO.DHAM INT'L L.J. 1202 (1994).
38. Prepared Statement of Cyrus 1R Vance and Herbert A. Okun Before the Foreign Opera-
tions Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (May 13,
1994), available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File [hereinafter Vance & Okun Testi-
mony].-
39. Vance & Okun, supra note 13, at 199.
40. Fact Sheet: US. Initiatives for Demining and Landmine Control, 5 DEP'T ST. DIS-
PATCH 362 (May 30, 1994).
41. Id.
42. ICRC Report, supra note 8, at 171. There is some evidence that landmines do
not serve the important military purpose that military leaders believe. Steven Askin &
Stephen Goose, The Market for Anti-Personnel Landmines -A Global Survey, 6JANE's INTELLI-
GENCE REViEW 425 (1994). At an industry symposium last year, retired U.S. Marine
Corps Commandant General Gray said that he was "not aware of any operational advan-
tage from the broad deployment of mines," and that he "knows of no situation in the
Korean War, nor in the five years [he] served in Southeast Asia, nor in Panama, nor
Desert Shield/Desert Storm, where [U.S.] use of mine warfare truly channeled the en-
emy into a destructive pattern." Id. The Arms Project & Physicians for Human Rights
cite a quote in a biography of former U.S. Secretary of State Robert McNamara that a
pentagon study discloses the fact that "although the army kept asking for more mines,
one fifth to one third of all U.S. deaths were caused by these devices, while they killed
relatively few enemy in exchange." LANDMINES: A DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 37, at 338
(citation omitted).
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vulnerable to attack, and to restrict the mobility of the enemy
while under attack.48
Because of their low cost, ease of use, and terrorizing ef-
fects," landmines have become the weapon of choice among
military forces with few resources.4 5 These forces use mines of-
fensively, often targeting civilian objectives,' 6 in violation of in-
ternational law.47 Insurgent forces in internal guerilla armed
conflicts recognize the value of landmines not only for their mili-
tary utility, but also because they weaken the opposition's eco-
nomic, social, and political infrastructures.48 These forces, akin
to terrorists, have directed landmines in random and wide-scale
practice at civilian objectives as anti-morale or terror weapons.49
Guerrilla and other irregular forces lay the majority of mines,
and tend to rely on the least expensive types,5" which are often
the most injurious to civilians.51
43. ICRC Report, supra note 8, at 171.
44. HIDDEN KILLERS, supra note 3, at 7.
45. Vance & Okun, supra note 13, at 199. The U.S. Department of State notes that
landmines are the weapon of choice for many government and insurgent forces. Fact
Sheet: U.S. Initiatives for Demining and Landmine Control, supra note 40, at 362. The
forces using landmines in less developed countries often are not the militaries of the
state. McGrath, supra note 15, at 9.
46. Fact Sheet: U.S. Initiatives for Demining and Landmine Control, supra note 40, at
362. The Landmine Protocol defines a "civilian objective" as any object that is not a
military objective. CCW, supra note 1, Protocol II, art. 2(5), 1342 U.N.T.S. at 168, 19
I.L.M. at 1530. A "military objective" is defined as an object that "by its nature, location,
purpose or use makes an effective contribution to military action and whose total or
partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time,
offers a definite military advantage." Id. art. 2(4), 1324 U.N.T.S. at 168, 19 I.L.M. at
1530.
47. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I),
Dec. 12, 1977, art. 51(4)(a), 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, 26, 16 I.L.M. 1391, 1413 [hereinafter
Additional Protocol I] (prohibiting attacks not directed at military objectives); CCW,
supra note 1, Protocol II, art. 3(2), 1342 U.N.T.S. at 169, 19 I.L.M. at 1530 (prohibiting
direction of landmines against civilians).
48. ICRC Report, supra note 8, at 173.
49. See McGrath, supra note 15, at 9-10 (describing insurgent, or guerrilla parties
to armed conflicts); see supra note 15 and accompanying text (discussing use of
landmines by insurgents, guerrillas, and terrorists).
50. Prepared Statement of Cyrus R. Vance and Herbert A. Okun Before the Foreign Opera-
tions Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee, supra note 38.
51. State Department Special Briefing, supra note 5. These forces primarily use mines
that are not equipped with self-destructing or self-neutralizing mechanisms, and tend to
use minimal metal mines, which are difficult for deminers to detect. Id.
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2. The Effects of Modem Technology on Landmine Warfare
Mines can now be remotely delivered 52 ("scatterables"),
either by artillery, helicopter, or fixed-wing aircraft.53 This en-
ables forces to place mines deep into enemy territory and be-
hind enemy lines, changing the role of mines from battlefield
weapons to theater-wide weapons of mass destruction. 54 Accu-
rately recording the location of scatterables is impossible be-
cause they are deployed rapidly and remotely. 5 The capability
to lay vast quantities of mines, the greater geographic range at
which remotely delivered mines can be directed,56 and the diffi-
culty in recording their location make scatterables more offen-
sive to humanitarian concerns than hand-emplaced landmines."7
The delegates who drafted the CCW considered banning the use
of scatterables altogether.58
Technological advances have increased the longevity of
landmines and decreased the ability of deminers to detect them
as well. In the late 1970's, mine manufacturers began using
more plastic and less metal in the manufacturing of mines,59
which provided mines with better protection from the natural
elements and made mines less likely to become inoperative over
time." Metal-detectors are nearly useless in the effort to clear
landmines with minimal metal contents, which increases the
costs, both monetarily and in terms of human lives, of dealing
with landmines.61 A low metallic content adds little, if any, mili-
52. Report of the Final Experts Meeting, supra note 10, annex I, art. 2(2), at 2. A
remotely delivered mine is not emplaced by hand, but delivered from a remote launch-
ing system or aircraft. Id.
53. Lt. Col. N. Hamish Rollo, The Militay Use of Anti-Personnel Mines, in MoNTREux
SYMPosIUM, supra note 3, at 211, 216.
54. See Anderson Testimony, supra note 7 (discussing larger range at which remotely
delivered mines can be emplaced). Military forces with sophisticated remote delivering
systems can lay mines well beyond areas they could safely reach with troops. Id. Tacti-
cal and geographic obstacles can no longer stop the laying of mines beyond enemy
lines and deep into enemy territory. Id.
55. HIDDEN KILLERS, supra note 3, at 54; Terry Gander, Anti-Personnel Mine Warfare -
An Outline, in MoNTREux SYMPOSIUM, supra note 3, at 204.
56. Anderson Testimony, supra note 7.
57. LANDMINES: A DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 37, at 27, 343.
58. Id. at 27, 300 (discussing possibility of ban on remotely delivered mines); Car-
nahan, supra note 28, at 79-80 (mentioning that several delegates wanted to ban use of
remotely delivered mines altogether).
59. State Department Special Briefing, supra note 5.
60. See id. (describing effects of manufacturing mines with high plastic content).
61. U.S. DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AND U.S. ARMY FOREIGN SCIENCE AND TECH-
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tary advantage.62 Military experts at an ICRC symposium agreed
that imposing a requirement of detectability3 would have few
negative consequences, as far as military utility is concerned.' 4
Another modem landmine option is to have mines fitted
with devices that either render them inert ("self-neutralizing")
or cause them to detonate ("self-destructing") after a fixed pe-
riod of time.65 Deminers would prefer self-destructing to self-
neutralizing mines.' Self-neutralizing mines still deny access to
the land, 7 can be dug-up and reused, and may become more
dangerous as they decompose. 68 Self-neutralizing and self-
destructing devices have failure rates that some feel are unac-
ceptable. 69 Many also feel that any restrictions concerning self-
neutralizing or self-destructing mines would not be productive
without specifications on the delay time between the deploy-
ment and the activation of mines equipped with these devices.7"
C. Legal History of the Restrictions on Landmine Warfare
The use of landmines is regulated by principles of custom-
NOLOGY CENTER, LANDMINES WARFARE - TRENDS & PROJECTIONS 4-1 (1992); NATO Lacks
Technoloy To Detect Plastic Landmine, Agence France Presse, Nov. 9, 1994, available in
LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File. Mechanical mine clearing systems are not yet
capable of achieving a clearance rate acceptable to humanitarian needs. Patrick M.
Blagden, Summary of United Nations Demining, in MONTREUX SYMPOSIUM, supra note 3, at
117. Most mine clearance is therefore accomplished by hand. Id.
62. Jefferson, supra note 3, at 109-10; J. Alistair Craib, Mine Detection: The Military
Necessity to Render Anti-Personnel Mines Non Detectable, in MONTREUX SYMPOSIUM, supra
note 3, at 207, 209; see also Rollo, supra note 53, at 211 (describing how minimum metal
mines contribute little military utility).
63. Group of Governmental Experts to Prepare the Review Conference of the States Parties to
the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which
may be Deemed to be Excesively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects, 2d Sess., art. 6, at 9,
U.N. Doc. CCW/Conf.I/GE/CRP.2 (1994) [hereinafter Report of the Second Experts Meet-
ing]. A detectable mine is one that has a sufficiently high metal content to be located
using widely available detection equipment. Id.
64. ICRC Report, supra note 8, at 181.
65. Jeab-Pierre Golay, Self-Neutralizing and Self-Destruct Mechanisms for Anti-Personnel
Mines, in MoNTREUx SymPOSIUM, supra note 3, at 111, 113-15. Mines without self-neu-
tralizing or self-destructing devices are "long-lived" mines.
66. Jefferson, supra note 3, at 107-08.
67. See LNDMINES: A DEADLY LErGACY, supra note 37, at 29. The combination of
the possibility of failure of self-neutralizing devices and the necessary high rate of clear-
ance demands that deminers approach every mine that is supposed to self-neutralize as
if the mine were active. Id.; ICRC Report, supra note 8, annex II.
68. ICRC Report, supra note 8, at 139.
69. Jefferson, supra note 3, at 106-08.
70. Id.
1995] THE LANDMINE REVIEW CONFERENC 1535
ary international law that have been expressly codified in several
multilateral treaties.7' These treaties were premised on unwrit-
ten but widely accepted principles of customary international
law that state that the right to adopt methods of warfare is not
unlimited, that the use of weapons that cannot be effectively di-
rected at military objectives is prohibited, and that weapons that
cause unnecessary suffering are prohibited.72 These principles
require a balancing test between military utility and humanita-
rian concerns.73 Despite the extensive codification in treaties
that has taken place over the past century, the fundamental prin-
ciples of customary international law continue to act as limita-
tions on warfare.7 4 The Martens Clause, which first appeared in
the Hague Peace Conferences, establishes that in cases not ex-
pressly provided for, the laws of humanity and public conscience
will continue to regulate methods of warfare employed by parties
to armed conflicts.75
1. St. Petersburg Declaration
The 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration 76 was the first interna-
tional treaty prohibiting the use of a specific type of weapon. 7
71. Falk, supra note 6, at 74; HIDDEN KILLERS, supra note 3, at 55-56.
72. Louise Doswald-Beck & Gerald C. Cauderay, The Development of New Anti-Person-
nel Weapons, 279 INT'L REv. RED CROSS 565, 565-66 (1990).
73. ADAM ROBERTS & RICHARD GUELFF, DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR 4-5
(1989). This balancing test is known as proportionality. Id.
74. Id. at 4.
75. Doswald-Beck & Cauderay, supra note 72, at 565. The preamble of the 1907
Hague Convention reads:
Until a more complete code of the laws of war is issued, the High Contracting
Parties think it right to declare that in cases not included in the Regulations
adopted by them, populations and belligerents remain under the protection
and empire of the principles of international law, as they result from the us-
ages established between civilized nations, from the laws of humanity and the
requirements of public conscience.
1907 Hague Convention IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18,
1907, 1910 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 9 (Cmd. 5030), 2 A.J.I.L. 90-117. The Martens Clause also
appears in an article common to all of the Geneva Conventions, in Additional Protocol
I, and the CCW. DOCUMENTS ON THE LAwS OF WAR, supra note 73, at 4, n.8. The con-
cept of customary international law also implies that all parties in every conflict are
bound by such principles. Id. at 6.
76. Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles
Under 400 Grammes Weight, Dec. 11, 1868, 1 A.J.I.L. Supp. 96, 138 Consol. T.S. 297
[hereinafter St. Petersburg Declaration].
77. Doswald-Beck & Cauderay, supra note 72 at 566; LANDMINES: A DEADLY LEGACY,
supra note 37, at 312.
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The treaty recognized that the laws of humanity placed a limita-
tion on the methods that armed parties may employ in a con-
flict, and that the use of arms that uselessly aggravate human
suffering is contrary to the laws of humanity.7 8 The drafters of
the St. Petersburg Declaration concluded that a bullet designed
to explode upon contact with skin violated these principles, and
therefore banned its use.7 9
2. The Hague Peace Conferences
While the Hague Peace Conferences ° did not ban any
weapons for which a major power had a need, 1 they reaffirmed
the principle that parties may not use methods of warfare that
cause unnecessary suffering. 2 The 1899 Hague Declaration 3,"
in the spirit of the St. Petersburg Declaration, prohibited the use
of certain types of bullets that cause superfluous injury.84 This
declaration also prohibited the use of projectiles whose sole ob-
ject was to diffuse asphyxiating gases.8" The 1899 Conference
was the first successful attempt to codify a comprehensive regime
governing the laws of land warfare.86
3. 1925 Geneva Protocol
The 1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in
War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacterio-
78. St. Petersburg Declaration, supra note 76, 1 A.J.I.L. Supp. at 96, 138 Consol.
T.S. at 297.
79. LANDMINES: A DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 37, at 312; Doswald-Beck and
Cauderay, supra note 72, at 566; DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 73, at 30.
80. 1899 Hague Declaration 2 Concerning Asphyxiating Gases,July 29, 1899, 1907
Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 32 (Cmd. 3751), 1 A.J.I.L. Supp. 157; 1899 Hague Declaration 3 Con-
cerning Expanding Bullets, July 29, 1899, 1907 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 32 (Cmd. 3751), 1
A.J.I.L. Supp. 155 [hereinafter 1899 Hague Declaration 3]; 1907 Hague Convention IV
Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 1910 Gr. Brit. T.S.
No. 9 (Cmd. 5030), 2 A.J.I.L. Supp. 90; 1907 Hague Convention V Respecting the
Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land, Oct. 18,
1907, 2 A.J.I.L. Supp. 117.
81. Geoffrey Best, The Restraint of War in Historical and Philosophical Perspective, in
HUMANITARIAN LAW OF ARMED CONFLUCT: CHALLENGES AHEAD 3, 20 (T.M.C. Asser In-
stituut ed., 1991)
82. Doswald-Beck & Cauderay, supra note 72, at 565-66.
88. 1899 Hague Declaration 3, supra note 80, 1907 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 32 (Cmd.
3751), 1 A.J.I.L. Supp. at 155.
84. WILUAM I. HULL, THE Two HAGUE CONFERENCES 468 (1908).
85. DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWs OF WAR, supra note 73, at 35.
86. Id. at 43.
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logical Methods of Warfare17 ("1925 Geneva Protocol") derives
its authority from customary international law prohibiting weap-
ons that cause unnecessary suffering.8 8 The 1925 Geneva Proto-
col prohibits not only means of warfare that cause unnecessary
suffering, but also means of warfare that have indiscriminate ef-
fects.89 Like the Hague Peace Conferences, the 1925 Geneva
Protocol banned the use of asphyxiating gases. 90 This Protocol
was supplemented by the 1972 Biological Weapons Conven-
tion,9 which was the first international agreement to ban not
just use, but the production, stockpiling, and transfer of a spe-
cific weapon type.92
4. Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions93
The 1949 Geneva Conventions,94 which are mainly con-
cerned with protecting the victims of war,95 are adhered to by
more states than any other laws of war agreement. 96 The 1977
Additional Protocols were intended to supplement rather than
replace the 1949 Geneva Conventions.97 Additional Protocol I
87. Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or
Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571,
94 L.N.T.S. 65 [hereinafter 1925 Geneva Protocol].
88. LANDMINES: A DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 37, at 314.
89. Id.
90. 1925 Geneva Protocol, supra note 87, 26 U.S.T. at 571-72, 94 L.N.T.S. at 69.
91. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpil-
ing of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxic Weapons and on their Destruction, Apr.
10, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 583, 1976 Gr. Brit. T.S. 11 (Cmd. 6397).
92. LANDMINES: A DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 37, at 315.
93. Additional Protocol I, supra note 47. Additional Protocol II is concerned with
the protection of victims of non-international armed conflicts. Protocol Additional to
the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Relating to the Protection of Victims of
Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609, 16
I.L.M. 1442.
94. Geneva Conventions For The Protection of War Victims Concerning: I Ame-
lioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, II
Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed
Forces at Sea, III Treatment of Prisoners of War, IV Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31.
95. Additional Protocol I, supra note 47, pmbl., 1 3, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 7, 16 I.L.M.
at 1396.
96. DOCUMENTS ON THE LAwS OF WAR, supra note 73, at 169. There are 165 states
listed as parties to the Geneva Conventions. Id. at 326-31. Some view the basic princi-
ples of the Geneva Conventions as being declaratory of customary international law. Id.
at 169-70.
97. DOCUMENTS ON THE LAwS OF WAR, supra note 73, at 388.
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was designed to protect the victims of international conflicts.98
While the Geneva Conventions applied only to international
conflicts," Additional Protocol I was extended to include wars of
national liberation and conflicts directed against racist re-
gimes.100 Additional Protocol I prohibits certain methods of
warfare, but does not contain formal prohibitions concerning
specific weapons.' 0
a. Article 35
Article 35 of Additional Protocol I codifies the established
principle of the laws of war that parties to an armed conflict are
not free to use any method of warfare.10 2 Paragraph 1 reminds
the parties to an armed conflict that the right to choose methods
or means of warfare is not unlimited, l0 3 codifying a principle but
not enumerating any affirmative rights or duties.1 4 Paragraph 2
prohibits the use of weapons or methods that are of a nature to
cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering.10 5 Paragraph
3 prohibits methods or means of warfare that inflict widespread,
long-term, and severe damage to the natural environment. i06
Paragraphs 2 and 3 both place an affirmative duty on military
leaders to refrain from acts that have a particular effect.1
0 7
98. Additional Protocol I, supra note 47, pmbl., 1 3, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 7, 16 I.L.M.
at 1396.
99. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 2, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 3115, 75
U.N.T.S. 31, 32. Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions makes the Convention applicable
to "all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two
or more of the High Contracting Parties." Id.
100. Additional Protocol I, supra note 47, art. 1(4), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 7, 16 I.L.M. at
1397. The Additional Protocol I is still precluded from applying to many internal con-
flicts that the U.S. Department of State claims exhibit the most egregious misuses of
landmines. HIDDEN KiLaS, supra note 3, at 56.
101. ICRC, COMMENTARY ON THE ADDmONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE
GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AucusT 1949 394 (1987); DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF
WAR, supra note 73, at 471.
102. Additional Protocol I, supra note 47, art. 35, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 21, 16 I.L.M. at
1408-09.
103. Id.
104. Id. art. 35(1), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 21, 16 I.L.M. at 1408.
105. Id. art. 35(2), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 21, 16 I.L.M. at 1409.
106. Id. art. 35(3), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 21, 16 I.L.M. at 1409. The U.S. Department of
State calls landmines the "most toxic and widespread pollution facing mankind." U.S.
DEP'T STATE, BUREAU OF POLITIcAL-MILITARY AFFAIRS, HIDDEN KILLERS: THE GLOBAL
LANDMINE CaIsIs 2 (1993).
107. Id, art. 35(2)-(3), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 21, 16 I.L.M. at 1409.
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b. Article 51
Article 51 of Additional Protocol I prohibits attacks against
civilians and indiscriminate attacks.' Article 51(4) defines an
indiscriminate attack as one that is not directed at a military ob-
jective, or that uses a means of warfare that cannot be directed at
a military objective.1"9 Due to the time-delayed characteristics of
landmines, commentators have argued that no deployed
landmines are capable of being directed at a military objective in
compliance with Article 51.110
D. The Landmine Protocol
The purpose of the Landmine Protocol of the CCW11 was
to apply the concrete expression of principles of customary in-
ternational law to the use of landmines. 112 The principles that
form the foundations for the Landmine Protocol date to the St.
Petersburg Declaration, the Hague Conventions, and the 1925
Geneva Protocol."'3 The Landmine Protocol is distinguished
from earlier agreements by being more concerned with protect-
ing civilians than soldiers.1 14
1. Scope and Definitions
Article 1 states the scope of the Landmine Protocol.' As a
part of the CCW, the Landmine Protocol applies in the same
situations as the Additional Protocol I, which include interna-
tional conflicts, wars of national liberation, and wars against ra-
108. Id. art. 51(4), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 26, 16 I.L.M. at 1413.
109. Id. art. 51(4)(a)-(b), 1125 U.N.T.S at 26, 16 I.L.M. at 1413. The flush lan-
guage of Article 51(4) states that indiscriminate attacks are those that are "of a nature
to strike military objectives and civilians or civilian objects without distinction." Id. art.
51(4), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 26, 16 I.L.M. at 1413.
110. LANDMINEs: A DEADLY LEcACy, supra note 37, at 289. The Arms Project and
Physicians for Human Rights concluded that, in reference to Article 51(4), "the use of
landmines is completely forbidden under this provision." Id.; see Falk, supra note 6, at
76 (declaring that objective reasoning concludes that Article 51 is violated by modem
use of landmines); Vance & Okun, supra note 13, at 207.
111. CCW, supra note 1, 1342 U.N.T.S. 137, 19 I.L.M. 1523.
112. ICRC Report, supra note 8, at 127; Carnahan, supra note 28, at 95; see supra
notes 71-75 and accompanying text (explaining customary international law).
113. DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 73, at 472.
114. Id. Civilians are the majority of the victims of landmines. See supra note 19
and accompanying text (noting that 80% of landmine victims are civilians).
115. CCW, sura note 1, Protocol II, art. 1, 1342 U.N.T.S. at 168, 19 I.L.M. at 1529.
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cist regimes. 116 The Landmine Protocol applies to the use of
mines, booby-traps, and other devices.1 17 Article 2 defines terms
to be used in the Landmine Protocol, including mine, booby-
trap, other devices, military objective, civilian objects, and re-
cording. 118
2. General Restrictions on the Use of Mines
Article 3 adapts the principles of Article 51 of the Addi-
tional Protocol I to the use of landmines. a9 The direction of
mines against civilians 12°  and the indiscriminate use of
landmines are prohibited.12 1 Both the Landmine Protocol and
the Additional Protocol I preclude, as indiscriminate, the use of
mines that are not directed at a military objective, or that cannot
be directed at a military objective.122 The Landmine Protocol,
however, adds a balancing test to the determination of what con-
stitutes "indiscriminate,"12 3 allowing the use that would other-
wise be considered indiscriminate if the expected ensuing dam-
age is not excessive when compared to the anticipated military
advantage.1
2 4
3. Restrictions on Mines That Are Not Remotely Delivered
Article 4 is concerned with restricting the use of landmines
116. Additional Protocol I, supra note 47, art. 1(3)-(4), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 7, 16
I.L.M. at 1397.
117. CCW, supra note 1, Protocol II, art. 1, 1342 U.N.T.S. at 168, 19 I.L.M. at 1529.
The Landmine Protocol applies to "mines laid to interdict beaches, waterway crossings
or river crossings, but does not apply to the use of anti-ship mines at sea or in inland
waterways." Id. This Comment focuses on the application of the Landmine Protocol to
mines, but not booby-traps or other devices.
118. CCW, supra note 1, Protocol II, art. 2, 1342 U.N.T.S. at 168, 19 I.L.M. at 1530.
119. Carnahan, supra note 28, at 78.
120. CCW, supra note 1, Protocol II, art. 3(2), 1342 U.N.T.S. at 169, 19 I.L.M. at
1530.
121. Id. art. 3(3), 1342 U.N.T.S. at 169, 19 I.L.M. at 1530.
122. Id.; Additional Protocol I, supra note 47, art. 51, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 26, 16
I.L.M. at 1413.
123. CCW, supra note 1, Protocol II, art. 3(3) (c), 1342 U.N.T.S. at 169, 19 I.L.M. at
1530. "Indiscriminate use is any placement of such weapons . . . (c) Which may be
expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian
objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete
and direct military advantage anticipated." Id.
124. Id. Commentators have noted that this test has the effect of providing less
protection to civilians than Article 51 of the Additional Protocol I, upon which the
Landmine Protocol was based. LANDMINES: A DEADLv LEGACy, supra note 37, at 262,
271-73; Falk, supra note 6, n.15.
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that are not remotely delivered. 125 Article 4(2) prohibits the use
of landmines in populated areas where there is no ground com-
bat.121 Such use is excepted from that prohibition, however, if
the mines are either placed in close proximity to a military objec-
tive, or if measures are taken to protect the civilians from the
effects of the mines. 12 7
4. Restrictions on Remotely Delivered Mines
Article 5 imposes additional restrictions on the use of re-
motely delivered mines.128 The first paragraph prohibits their
use unless the mines are directed at a military objective and 1)
their location is accurately recorded; or 2) the mines are
equipped with an effective self-neutralizing or self-destructing
device.'2 9 The second paragraph requires that effective advance
warning be given of any delivery of scatterables that might affect
the civilian population, if practicable.3 0
5. Recording the Location of Mines
Paragraph 1 of Article 7 requires that parties record13 1 the
location of all pre-planned minefields.1 2 Paragraph 2 imposes a
duty on parties to attempt to record the locations of all other
minefields.13 3 Paragraph 3 requires parties to keep all such
125. CCW, supra note 1, Protocol II, art. 4, 1342 U.N.T.S. at 169, 19 I.L.M. at 1531.
126. Id. art. 4(2), 1342 U.N.T.S. at 169, 19 I.L.M. at 1531.
127. Id.
128. Id. art. 5, 1342 U.N.T.S. at 169, 19 I.LM. at 1531.
129. Id. art. 5(1), 1342 U.N.T.S. at 169, 19 I.L.M. at 1531.
130. Id. art. 5(2), 1342 U.N.T.S. at 169, 19 I.L.M. at 1531. Commentators have
expressed concerns that Article 5 fails to consider that it does not seem possible to ever
accurately record scatterables, and that experience has shown that any field com-
mander would find that every circumstance does not permit effective advance warning,
due to the nature of deploying remotely delivered mines. Gerald Cauderay, Anti-Person-
nel Mines, 295 INT'L REv. RED CROSS 273, 281 (1993); HIDDEN KILLERS, supra note 3, at
54.
131. See CCW, supra note 1, Protocol II, art. 2(6), 1342 U.N.T.S. at 168, 19 I.L.M. at
1530. Article 2(6) defines recording as "a physical, administrative and technical opera-
tion designed to obtain, for the purpose of registration in the official records, all avail-
able information facilitating the location of minefields, mines and booby-traps. Id.
132. CCW, supra note 1, Protocol II, art. 7(1) (a), 1342 U.N.T.S. at 170, 19 I.L.M. at
1532. The word "pre-planned" is not defined, but suggests a degree of planning more
than "planned." Carnahan, supra note 28, at 84.
133. CCW, supra note 1, Protocol II, art. 7(2), 1342 U.N.T.S. at 168, 19 I.L.M. at
1530. "The parties shall endeavor to ensure the recording of the location of all other
minefields, mines and booby-traps which they have laid or placed in position." Id.
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records, and to provide these records to certain parties in cer-
tain circumstances in order to protect civilians and U.N. mis-
sions and to help in the process of clearing minefields after the
cessation of hostilities.134
6. Protecting U.N. Forces and Missions, and International
Cooperation in the Removal of Mines
Article 8 is concerned with the protection of U.N. forces
and missions.'1 5 When the head of a U.N. force or mission re-
quests, parties to an armed conflict are required, when practica-
ble, to remove or neutralize mines in the area, take measures to
protect the force or mission, and make available all information
concerning mines in the area. 136 Paragraph 2 imposes a duty on
parties to a conflict to provide protection, when possible, to any
U.N. fact-finding mission. 1 7 If providing protection is not possi-
ble, the party must provide all available information concerning
mines to the head of the mission. 3 Article 9 requires parties,
after the cessation of active hostilities, to assist each other in re-
moving mines or rendering minefields ineffective.139
E. Individual Countries and Organizations
1. United States
While formerly a large exporter of landmines,140 and still a
producer, the United States has recently taken a leadership role
in the effort to curb the global landmine crisis.1 41 The United
States stopped exporting mines in 1992, and has publicly played
a role in attempting to get other countries to halt exports. 142
134. Id. art. 7, 1342 U.N.T.S. at 170, 19 I.L.M. at 1532.
135. Id. art. 8, 1342 U.N.T.S. at 171, 19 I.L.M. at 1533.
136. Id. art. 8(1), 1342 U.N.T.S. at 171, 19 I.L.M. at 1533.
137. Id. art. 8(2), 1342 U.N.T.S. at 171, 19 I.L.M. at 1533.
138. Id.
139. Id. art. 9, 1342 U.N.T.S. at 171, 19 I.L.M. at 1534.
140. Askin & Goose, supra note 42. The United States shipped at least 4.4 million
mines since 1969 (until the export moratorium went into effect in 1992). Id.
141. Anderson Testimony, supra note 7. The United States is also a leader in the area
of demining. See generally HIDDEN KILLERS, supra note 3 (describing efforts of United
States to help clear mines from infested countries).
142. Pub. L. No. 102-484, § 1365, 106 Stat. 2561 (1992) (to be codified at 22 U.S.C.
2778). The United States adopted a unilateral export moratorium on anti-personnel
landmines in October 1992. Id. The moratorium was extended by three years in 1993.
HIDDEN KILLERS, supra note 3, at 56. In November 1993, Senator Leahy [D-Vt.], who
sponsored the legislation, introduced a non-binding resolution that passed before the
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Recently, the United States became a state party to the CCW,1 43
and U.S. President Bill Clinton, in a speech to the U.N. General
Assembly, called for the eventual elimination of the use of
landmines.1" For now, however, the United States supports the
tightening of restrictions at the Review Conference, but not a
total ban.
1 45
a. Ratification of the Conventional Weapons Convention
Neither President Ronald Reagan nor President George
Bush submitted the CCW to the U.S. Senate for ratification." 4
In May of 1994, President Clinton submitted the CCW, including
the Landmine Protocol, to the Senate. 47 The Senate ratified
the CCW on March 24, 1995, which will allow the United States
to participate as a full member at the Review Conference.1 48 As
a state party, the United States will play a larger role and have
full voting rights.1
49
The Clinton Administration has acknowledged the inade-
quacy of the current Landmine Protocol.' At the Review Con-
ference, the U.S. delegation will push for several amendments to
United Nations General Assembly, deploring the consequences of landmines and call-
ing on member states to enact their own export moratoria. Id. The State Department
reported, in January 1995, that 18 countries have proclaimed moratoria of their own,
and 3 or 4 others have export controls in place that are analogous to moratoria. State
Department Special Briefing, supra note 5. A September 1994 article listed the United
States, Argentina, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, the Netherlands, Poland,
Slovakia, Spain, South Africa, and Switzerland as having banned exportation, with Italy
having banned production and exportation, and Great Britain having banned mines
without self-neutralizing devices. Askin & Goose, supra note 42.
143. Washington News, U.P.I., Mar. 24, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library,
CURNWS File.
144. President Clinton, Building a Secure Future On the Foundation of Democracy, 5
DEP'T ST. DISPATCH 633 (Sept. 26, 1994).
145. Fact Sheet: U.S. Initiatives for Demining and Landmine Control, supra note 40, at
362.
146. Vance & Okun, supra note 13, at 201.
147. Testimony March 7, 1995 Michaelj Matheson, Principal Deputy Legal Advisor, De-
partment of State, Senate Foreign Relations, Convention on Conventional Weapons, Federal
Document Clearing House Congressional Testimony, Mar. 7, 1995, available in LEXIS,
News Library, CURNWS File [hereinafter Matheson Testimony].
148. Washington News, supra note 143; CCW, supra note 1, art. 5(2), 1342 U.N.T.S.
at 165, 19 I.L.M. at 1526. States that are not parties will still be invited to participate as
observers. Id. art. 8, 1342 U.N.T.S. at 166, 19 I.L.M. at 1527.
149. Washington News, supra note 143.
150. Matheson Testimony, supra note 147.
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the Landmine Protocol.151 These proposals include: 1) ex-
tending the scope of the Landmine Protocol to include internal
conflicts; 2) requiring that all remotely delivered mines be
equipped with self-destructing devices; 3) requiring that all
mines without self-destruct and self-deactivation15 2 devices only
be used within controlled, marked, and monitored minefields;
4) requiring that all mines be made detectable; 5) requiring that
the party that lays the mines be responsible for their ultimate
disposal; and 6) adding an effective verification mechanism.153
b. Policy of the United States Regarding a Total Ban
The U.S. policy regarding a total ban of landmines has
changed. On December 16, 1993, the United States was one of
only three countries to abstain from the U.N. Resolution to hold
a Review Conference of the CCW.' 54 The United States ab-
stained because it objected to an amendment asking the Confer-
ence to discuss all aspects of the landmine crisis, including a to-
tal ban. 5 5 On September 26, 1994, President Clinton unveiled a
plan for a landmine control regime that poses as an ultimate
goal the complete elimination of anti-personnel mines. 5 6 Ac-
cording to the U.S. Department of State, however, complete
elimination is a long term goal.'57 The U.S. military feels that
landmines are essential, so the complete elimination would not
occur until alternatives acceptable to the military were avail-
able.1 58
Clinton's control regime, by urging restrictions on the ex-
151. Id.
152. Report of the Final Experts Meeting, supra note 10, annex I, art. 2(12), at 3. Self-
deactivating means "automatically rendering a munition inoperable by means of the
irreversible exhaustion of a component that is essential to the operation of the muni-
tion." Id.
153. Matheson Testimony, supra note 147.
154. Patrick J. Leahy, U.S. Can Help Stop the Land-Mine Slaughter, NY. TIMES, Jan.
13, 1994, at A20.
155. Anderson Testimony, supra note 7. President Clinton stated in a letter to Sena-
tor Leahy in February 1994 that "[w]hile we fully supported the overall thrust of the
resolution, we could not vote for it because the U.S. Armed Forces continue to require
landmines to accomplish certain military missions." Vance & Okun, supra note 13, at
204 (citation omitted).
156. President Clinton, supra note 144, at 633-36.
157. Worsnip, supra note 24.
158. Telephone interview with Valerie Belon, U.S. Department of State (Jan. 12,
1995).
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port, production, and stockpiling of landmines, hopes to reduce
the availability of mines, reduce the reliance on the most danger-
ous types of mines, and reinforce the Landmine Protocol restric-
tions. 159 The proposed regime will work independently of the
Landmine Protocol.1"' The Clinton administration has stated
that it will continue to urge countries to enact moratoria until
the proposed regime is in place.161 The regime would replace
the standard moratorium with restrictions that would only allow
the export of "safe" mines to countries that were not on a "no-
arms" list.1 62
2. Europe
Italy does not manufacture landmines, ratified the CCW in
December of 1994, and has expressed support of Sweden's mo-
tion to amend the Landmine Protocol so that it constitutes a
total ban.16' Belgium has outlawed the production and use of
anti-personnel mines" and has pledged to destroy the mines it
has in stock.165 Estonia supports a total ban and has proposed
that the Landmine Protocol be amended accordingly. 66
In December 1992 the European Parliament passed a reso-
lution demanding that all Member States declare a five year mor-
atorium on the export of landmines, ratify the CCW, and make
the CCW applicable to internal warfare. 67 On October 8, 1993,
159. President Clinton, supra note 144, at 633-36.
160. Interview with David Gowdey, Department of Humanitarian Affairs, United
Nations, in New York (Jan. 30, 1995).
161. Fact Sheet: U.S. Policy on a Landmine Control Regime, 5 DEP'T ST. DISPATCH 637
(Sept. 26, 1994).
162. Id. At least one Non-Governmental Organization has claimed that the admin-
istration's loosening of export restrictions is due in part to pressure from U.S. corpora-
tions that have not been able to sell their mines abroad since 1992. Telephone inter-
view with Scott Nathanson, Peace Action Education Fund, (Feb. 24, 1995).
163. Jorge Pina, Italy: Parliament Approves Convention Against Anti-Personnel Mines,
Inter Press Service, Dec. 6, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File. It has
been reported that, after Italy banned the exportation and production of anti-person-
nel mines, a company in Singapore purchased parts and components for the local as-
sembly of at least 7 million Italian mines. Askin & Goose, supra note 42
164. Michael Dynes, Pressure Grows on Britain to Outlaw Mines, TIMES, Mar. 3, 1995,
available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.
165. Belgium Bans All Trade in Anti-Personnel Mines, Reuters, Mar. 2, 1995, available
in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.
166. Report of the Third Experts Meeting, supra note 9, annex, app. II, at 27 (propos-
ing that Landmine Protocol prohibit use, development, manufacture, stockpiling, and
transfer of anti-personnel mines).
167. European Parliament Motion for a Resolution, Dec. 14, 1992, rerinted in
1546 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 18:1526
the European Community Member States, together with Austria,
Finland, Norway, and Sweden, introduced a resolution before
the U.N. General Assembly urging states and organizations to do
more to solve the global landmines crisis. 168 Ireland,1 69 Sweden,
and Austria have been reported as supporting a total ban.
1 70
France, the country that requested the Review Conference,
171
does not export anti-personnel mines. 172 France has been re-
ported, however, like Germany, as promoting only those restric-
tions that it believes are likely to succeed, such as allowing the
use of mines which self-destruct.1
73
Great Britain does not support a total ban on landmines.
Like the United States, Great Britain believes that landmines can
play a legitimate defensive role if used in accordance with the
rules.17 4  Great Britain is willing, however, to amend the
Landmine Protocol so that all mines must be equipped with an
effective self-destruct mechanism. 75 According to the Foreign
Office, Great Britain widened its export moratorium in March
1995 to prohibit the export of non-detectable mines, and to for-
bid the export of mines to countries that have not ratified the
CCW. 76
LANDMINES: A DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 37, at 450; EP Calls for Five-Year Export Morato-
rium on Anti-Personnel Mines, Reuter European Community Report, Dec. 18, 1992, avail-
able in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.
168. Draft Resolution before the General Assembly, 48th Sess., Agenda Item 155, A/48/
1.5, Oct. 8, 1993, re "Assistance in Mine Clearance."
169. Andy Pollak, UN Convention on Landmine Use Ratified by Ireland, IRISH TIMES,
Mar. 24, 1995, at 5. Ireland ratified the CCW in March of 1995. Id. Joan Burton,
Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Ireland, says that "Ireland was calling for a total
ban on the manufacture, stockpiling, export and use of landmines." Id.
170. EU: NGOs Call for Coherent Strategy Regarding Anti-Personnel Mines, Reuter
Textline Agence Europe, Nov. 24, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS
File; Chemical Weapons are now Banned: Landmines Must be Next, Times, Mar. 3, 1995,
available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.
171. LANDMINES: A DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 37, at 324.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Michael Sheridan, UK: Britain Helps to Block A Global Ban on Mines, INDEPEND-
ENT, Oct. 28, 1994, available in LEXIS, News File, CURNWS File.
175. Id.
176. Landmine Export Ban is Extended, DAIY TELEGRAPH, Mar. 16, 1995, at 4.
Prohibiting the export of non-detectable mines is consistent with Article 6 of the pro-
posals that the Review Conference will use to amend the Landmine Protocol. Report of
the Final Experts Meeting, supra note 10, annex I, art. 6, at 6. Forbidding the export to
states non-parties is consistent with the proposed Article 6 ter(1). Report of the Final
Experts Meeting, supra note 10, annex I, art. 6 ter( 1), at 8. Great Britain did not ratify the
CCW until February of 1995. Dynes, supra note 164.
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3. Africa
One-third of the world's landmines are in Africa, but only
three of its countries are parties to the CCW.1 ' An ICRC dele-
gate stated that the low participation rate is due to a lack of
awareness on the part of African states. 178 Ethiopia's Foreign
Ministry, however, recently announced that it supports a total
ban, and is willing to work with international organizations to
address the CriSiS. 1 7
9
4. United Nations
In December 1993, noting the extent of the damage that
landmines have done to unarmed civilians, the U.N. General As-
sembly passed a resolution calling on states to enact their own
landmine export moratorium.180 The United Nations passed a
similar resolution, without opposition, in December of 1994.181
The 1994 resolution seeks the eventual elimination of the use of
landmines.18 2
The U.N. Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, advo-
cates a total ban.1 83 Secretary General Boutros-Ghali also pro-
poses adding landmines to the U.N. Register of Conventional
Weapons' 84 to help inform the global community of who is mak-
177. Experts to Tackle Landmines Problems on African Continent, Agence France Presse,
Feb. 27, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File. The countries are
Benin, Niger, and Tunisia. Id.
178. Id. The ICRC held a conference in early March 1995 to promote interna-
tional treaties to regulate the use of landmines. Id.
179. Ethiopia Supports Ban on Anti-Personnel Mines, Xinhua News Agency, Feb. 23,
1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.
180. General and Complete Disarmament, U.N. GAOR 1st Comm., 48th sess., 81st
plen. mtg. at 14, U.N. Doc. A.RES/48/75 (1994).
181. United Nations Approves Leahy's Landmine Export Ban, Gannet News Service,
Dec. 16, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.
182. Id.
183. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, The Land Mine Crisis; A Humanitarian Disaster, FOREIGN
Ani., Sept./Oct. 1994, at 8.
184. Thalif Deen, Disarmament: U.N. Chief Wants World Body to Curb Small Arms, In-
ter Press Service, Jan. 9, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File. The
U.N. Register is a program where countries are requested to voluntarily provide data
every year on the number of certain types of weapons to the United Nations.
LANDMINES: A DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 37, at 113-14 This information is made avail-
able to the public. Id. Presently small arms, such as landmines, are not included in the
category of weapons reported in the register. Id.
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ing, buying, and selling landmines. 8 5 The Secretary-General ad-
vocates placing landmines in the same legal and ethical category
as chemical weapons, and calls for the international community
to ban production, stockpiling, trade, and use of mines and their
components. 186
5. Non-Governmental Organizations
Non-Governmental Organizations ("NGOs"), while not for-
mally part of the Review Conference, have played a substantial
role in the movement toward a total ban on landmines. The
ICRC, having seen the devastation wrought by landmines during
its humanitarian efforts, 187 has been pressuring the international
community for a total ban on landmines. 18 1 Similarly, NGOs in
numerous countries are lobbying the people and governments
on a local level about the horrific consequences of the use of
landmines. 18 9
Despite efforts to allow NGOs full participation in the Re-
view Conference and its preparatory meetings, 19° NGOs will only
be allowed, with a few exceptions, to speak at plenary sessions.' 9 '
This has led some commentators to state that military considera-
tions will be weighed disproportionately to humanitarian con-
cerns.1 92 Some NGOs, frustrated by this indifference to humani-
tarian concerns, have abstained from the effort to amend the
185. See LANDMINES: A DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 37, ch. 4, at 107-16 (explaining
importance of transparency in landmine transactions).
186. Boutros-Ghali, supra note 183, at 8. The Secretary-General discusses the
shortcomings of the Landmine Protocol and the extent of the damage done by
landmines. Id.
187. Sheridan, supra note 174.
188. Id.
189. Stephanie Nebehay, Coalition Calls for Total Ban on Landmines, Reuters, May
11, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.
190. Id. NGOs urged governments to allow them representation at the Govern-
mental Experts Meetings. Id. The United States pushed to grant the NGOs representa-
tion at the Governmental Experts Meetings. Vance & Okun Testimony, supra note 38.
191. Report of the Final Experts Meeting, supra note 10, at 1, 2. The ICRC, at the
invitation of the Secretary-General, who is the Depositary of the Convention, was al-
lowed to take part in the Group of Governmental Experts. Id. The U.N. Department of
Humanitarian Affairs, the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees and the
U.N. Children's Fund were allowed to participate as observers. Id. The Draft Rules of
Procedure for the Review Conference allow that NGOs may designate a representative
to attend public meetings (plenary sessions) and may make available written contribu-
tions. Id. annex III, rule 49.
192. Anderson Testimony, supra note 7.
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Landmine Protocol altogether.1 93
II. PROPOSALS TO AMEND THE LANDM1NE PROTOCOL AT
THE REVIEW CONERENCE
The United Nations has held four experts meetings in Ge-
neva in preparation for the Review Conference. '94 The first
meeting began in February 1994, and the last meeting ended in
January 1995.111 Shortly after the Second, Third, and Final
meetings, the United Nations released a report detailing the pro-
posed additions and deletions for the CCW that each meeting
agreed upon.196 The proposed additions and deletions from the
Final Experts Meeting are the proposals to amend the Landmine
Protocol upon which the participants of the Review Conference
will decide.1 97 The Experts Meetings were not public, and infor-
mation about which countries proposed particular provisions
has not been disseminated.1 9
A. Proposals Regarding the Scope of the Landmine Protocol
The Review Conference is likely to extend the jurisdiction
of the Landmine Protocol to include internal conflicts.19 9 The
193. Interview with David Gowdey, Department of Humanitarian Affairs, United
Nations, in New York (Jan. 30, 1995).
194. Report of the Final Experts Meeting, supra note 10, annex V.
195. Id. The first session was held between February 28 and March 9, 1994. Id.
The second session was between May 16 and 27, 1994. Id. The third session was be-
tween August 8 and 19, 1994. Id. The final session was between January 9 and 20, 1995.
Id.
196. Report of the Second Experts Meeting, supra note 63; Report of the Third Experts
Meeting, supra note 9; Report of the Final Experts Meeting, supra note 10. The Experts
Meetings Reports contain more than one version of a provision when the participants
of the meeting were able to agree that a provision should be altered, but were not able
to agree on a specific new provision. See, e.g., Report of the Final Experts Meeting, supra
note 10, annex I, art. 1, at 1 (displaying alternative proposals of Article 1 of the
Landmine Protocol).
197. Report of the Final Experts Meeting, supra note 10, annex III, rule 29, at 6.
198. Interview with David Gowdey, Department of Humanitarian Affairs, United
Nations, in New York (Jan. 30, 1995).
199. Frances Williams & Bruce Clark, UN agrees ban on landmine use, FIN. TIMES,Jan.
20, 1995, at 4; Experts Make "Remarkable Progress" on Mines Ban, Agence France Presse,
Jan. 20, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File. The Reports from the
Experts Meetings of the Second, Third, and Final Meetings all include proposals that
extend the scope to include internal conflicts. Report of the Second Experts Meeting, supra
note 63, art. 1, at 1. It was also proposed that the extension ofjurisdiction be included
in an article of the Convention, not the Protocol. Id. n.1, at 1. This sentiment was
mentioned in the Report of the Third Experts Meeting. Report of the Third Experts Meet-
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Final Experts Meeting has proposed two alternatives concerning
how far the new Landmine Protocol would extend.20 ' The first
alternative extends the jurisdiction of the Landmine Protocol to
apply in all circumstances during war and peace.2 0 ' The second
alternative extends the Landmine Protocol to apply to all parties
in conflicts within the territory of states parties, including dissi-
dent armed groups.20 2 The second alternative would not, how-




Article 2 of the Landmine Protocol contains definitions to
which subsequent articles refer.20 4 The participants of the Ex-
perts Meetings allow for separate definitions of "remotely deliv-
ered mines" and "anti-personnel mines. "201 The terms "self-
destructing mechanism," "self-neutralizing mechanism," "self-
deactivation," and "remote control" are also defined. 20 6 The Re-
view Conference will choose between two alternative definitions
for "anti-handling device."2 7
ing, supra note 9, annex, art. 1, at 8. The proposal did not progress past the final
experts meeting in January. Report of the Final Experts Meeting, supra note 10, annex I.
200. Report of the Final Experts Meeting, supra note 10, annex I, art. 1, at 1.
201. Id. art. 1, alt. A(2).
202. Id. art. 1, alt. B(2)-(3).
203. Id. art. 1, alt. B(2). Paragraph two provides that "[t]his Protocol shall not
apply to situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and
sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature, as not being armed con-
flicts." Id.
204. CCW, supra note 1, Protocol II, art. 2, 1342 U.N.T.S. at 168, 19 I.L.M. at 1530.
205. Report of Final Experts Meeting, supra note 10, annex I, art. 2(2)-(3), at 2. The
current Landmine Protocol defines "mine," and "remotely delivered mine" in the same
paragraph. CCW, supra note 1, Protocol II, art. 2(1), 1342 U.N.T.S. at 168, 19 I.L.M. at
1530.
206. Report of the Final Experts Meeting, supra note 10, annex I, art. 2, at 2. "'Self
destructing mechanism' means an incorporated automatically functioning mechanism
which secures the destruction of a munition." Id. art. 2(10), at 3. "'Self neutralizing
mechanism' means an incorporated automatically functioning mechanism which
secures the destruction of a munition." Id. art. 2(11), at 3. " 'Self deactivating' means
automatically rendering a munition inoperable by means of the irreversible exhaustion
of a component that is essential to the operation of the munition." Id. art. 2(12), at 3.
"'Remote Control' means a control by commands from a distance." Id. art. 2(13), at 3.
207. Report of the Final Experts Meeting, supra note 10, annex I, art. 2(14), at 3. An
anti-handling device is "a device by which a mine will explode when an attempt is made
to remove, neutralize or destroy the mine," or, in the alternative, "a device to protect a
munition against removal." Id.
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C. Proposals Regarding General Mine Restrictions
The Experts Meetings Reports and the current Landmine
Protocol forbid the direction of mines at civilians"°8 and the in-
discriminate use of mines.2 0 9 The proposed Article 3 promul-
gates the same balancing test as is currently applied in the
Landmine Protocol governing what constitutes "indiscrimi-
nate."2 10 Parties are allowed to use mines in a way that would
otherwise be precluded if the expected damage to civilians is not
excessive when compared to the anticipated military advan-
tage.2 11
The proposals to Article 3 include 'a provision that would
incorporate language analogous to Article 51 (5) (a) of the Addi-
tional Protocol I prohibiting the bombardment of a number of
individual military objectives within a town as a single military
objective. 1 The proposed Article 3 would require advance
warning, where feasible, before any mines are laid that would
208. See supra notes 119-24 and accompanying text (describing Article 3); Report of
the Second Experts Meeting, supra note 63, art. 3(2), at 4; Report of the Third Experts Meeting,
supra note 9, annex, art. 3(3), at 10; Report of the Final Experts Meeting, supra note 10,
annex 1, art. 3(5), at 4. "It is prohibited in all circumstances to direct weapons to which
this Article applies, either in offence, defence or by way of reprisal, against the civilian
population as such or against individual civilians." Id.
209. CCW, supra note 1, Protocol II, art. 3(3), 1342 U.N.T.S. at 169, 19 I.L.M. at
1530; Report of the Second Experts Meeting, supra note 63, art. 3(3), at 4; Report of the Third
Experts Meeting, supra note 9, annex, art. 3(4), at 11; Report of the Final Experts Meeting,
supra note 10, annex I, art. 3(6), at 4.
Indiscriminate use is any placement of such weapons:
(a) which is not on, or directed against, a military objective; or
(b) which employs a method or means of delivery which cannot be directed at
a specific military objective; or
(c) which may expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civil-
ian, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be ex-
cessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.
Id.
210. Report of the Final Experts Meeting, supra note 10, annex I, art. 3(6), at 4.
211. Id. art. 3(6)(c), at 4. The proposal does contain a list of circumstances that
the party would take into account during the balancing test of humanitarian and mili-
tary concerns. Id. art. 8(a)-(d), at 4. The current Landmine Protocol does not. CCW,
supra note 1, Protocol II, art. 3(4), 1342 U.N.T.S. at 169, 19 I.L.M. at 1531.
212. Report of the Final Experts Meeting, supra note 10, annex I, art. 3(7), at 4. "Sev-
eral clearly separated and distinct military objectives located in a city, town, village or
other area containing a similar concentration of civilians or civilian objects cannot be
treated as a single military objective." Id.; Additional Protocol I, supra note 47, art.
51(5) (a), 1125 U.N.T.S at 26, 16 I.L.M. at 1413 (displaying original language of provi-
sion).
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affect civilians. 213 States parties would also be responsible for
clearing any mines that they lay.2 14 Another Article 3 proposal
codifies customary international law dating back to the St. Pe-
tersburg Declaration by prohibiting the use of mines that are
designed to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering. 21 5
The proposed Paragraph 10 of Article 3 declares that the ulti-
mate goal of the restrictions and prohibitions of the Landmine
Protocol is a total ban on use, trade, production, and stockpiling
of anti-personnel landmines.21 6
D. Proposals Regarding Restrictions on Mines That Are Not
Remotely Delivered
Article 4 concerns restrictions on mines that are not re-
motely delivered.217 In an effort to address the problem of long-
lived mines, the proposed Article 4 prohibits the use of mines
that are not self-destructing.218 An exception would exist, how-
ever, for mines placed in a perimeter-marked2 19 area that is
fenced, marked, and monitored, and either cleared or turned
over to a responsible party before being abandoned.2 0 If a party
gains control of a mined area, that party would be required to
provide the protection of Article 4 until the mines have been
cleared.221 States parties would also be required to take all feasi-
ble measures to prevent tampering with perimeter-marking
materials, and to ensure that all mines comply with the Techni-
cal Annex's provisions on detectability.
222
213. Report of the Final Experts Meeting, supra note 10, annex I, art. 3(9), at 4.
214. Id. art. 3(2), at 3.
215. Id. art. 3(3), at 3.
216. Report of the Third Experts Meeting, supra note 9, annex, art. 3(8), at 11; Report of
the Final Experts Meeting, supra note 10, annex I, art. 3(10), at 5.
217. See supra notes 125-27 and accompanying text (describing Article 4).
218. Report of the Final Experts Meeting, supra note 10, annex I, art. 4(2), at 5.
219. ICRC Report, supra note 8, at 174. Military experts concluded that insurgent
forces almost never mark minefields, as they consider it a loss of effect against the op-
posing force. Id.
220. Report of the Final Experts Meeting, supra note 10, annex I, art. 4(2), at 5. Like
the Third Meeting, Paragraph 3 of the Final Experts Meeting absolves the party to the
conflict of Paragraph 2 responsibility if "such compliance is not feasible due to forcible
loss of control of the area as a result of enemy military action." Id. art. 4(3), at 5.
221. Id. art. 4(4), at 5.
222. Id. art. 4, at 5. The Technical Annex to the proposals gives specifications to
aid parties in complying with the provisions of the Landmine Protocol. Id. Technical
Annex.
THE LANDMINE REVIEW COFERNCE 155
E. Remotely Delivered Mine Proposals
Article 5 concerns remotely delivered mines. 3  The Review
Conference will be considering two proposals. The first prohib-
its the use of remotely delivered mines that are not self-destruct-
ing. 24 The second prohibits the use of mines that do not com-
ply with the Technical Annex provisions on detectability.22 5
Both effectively prohibit the use of remotely delivered mines
that are not detectable. 6
F. Proposed Article 6
Three proposals for Article 6 will be considered by the Re-
view Conference.2 2 7 The first, like the current Landmine Proto-
col, would prohibit the use of certain types of booby-traps.
2 28
The second proposal would prohibit the use, development, man-
ufacture, stockpiling and transfer of certain weapons, 229 applying
to either: 1) all anti-personnel mines; 2) mines without self-
destructing or self-neutralizing devices; or 3) booby-traps.23 0 A
footnote to the second proposed Article 6 of the Final Experts
Meeting Report acknowledges that not all delegations accept the
second proposed Article 6.231 The third alternative for Article 6,
designed to prevent the use of mines in ways contrary to the pur-
poses of the Landmine Protocol, concerns transfers232 and
would prohibit the transfer of any weapons defined in Article 2
to any entities that are not states, or to any states that are not
bound by the Landmine Protocol.2 3 3 States parties would under-
223. See supra notes 128-30 and accompanying text (describing Article 5).
224. Report of the Final Experts Meeting, supra note 10, annex I, art. 5, at 6
225. Id. art. 5 bis, at 6. The participants recognized that including the detectability
provision in this article would require the omission of the provision elsewhere in the
Protocol. Id. art. 5 bis, n.2, at 6.
226. Id.
227. Id. art. 6, at 6-7.
228. Id.
229. Id. art. 6 bis, at 7-8.
230. Id. This proposal requires states parties to destroy any such mines in their
ownership or possession. Id. It would also prohibit either the use, manufacture, stock-
piling, or transferring of mines that are not in compliance with the provisions on
detectability. Id. States would also be required to report to the Depositary any informa-
tion about any stockpiles of landmines in their possession. Id.
231. Id. art. 6 bis, n.3, at 7.
232. Id. art. 6 ter, n.5, at 8. Transfers involve the physical movement of mines into
or from national territory, and the transfer of title to and control over the mines. Id.
233. Id. art. 6 ter(1)-(2), at 8. One commentator expressed the belief that the
1995] 3
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take not to transfer mines that are prohibited in all circum-
stances to any states parties,23 4 and states parties would be al-
lowed to receive mines that are restricted only if they agree to
comply with humanitarian law.23 5
G. Proposals Regarding the Recording of Mines
The proposals regarding Article 7 seek to strengthen the cri-
teria that require parties to record the location of mines.23 6 The
proposals from the Final Experts Meeting would require parties
to comply with specifications for recording that are found in the
Technical Annex, 23 7 and to keep the records for use after the
cessation of hostilities. 38 Such records would be used to protect
civilians and would be made available to the U.N. Secretary-Gen-
eral.2 39
H. Proposals Regarding the Protection of UN. Forces and Missions
Article 8 of the Landmine Protocol concerns the protection
of U.N. forces and missions, whether for peacekeeping, observa-
tion, or fact-finding purposes.24 Proposed Paragraph 1 would
require parties, upon request, to provide all mine information to
the head of the U.N. operation. Parties would also be re
quired to remove or neutralize all mines in the area242 and to
take necessary measures to protect the personnel of the U.N.
forces. 43
The Final Experts Meeting Report contains three proposed
versions of Paragraph 2. In the first, if an authorized U.N. mis-
transfer clause is essential for successful compliance with the Landmine Protocol of
states that would otherwise be loathe to sign on. Interview with David Gowdey, Depart-
ment of Humanitarian Affairs, United Nations, in New York (Jan. 30, 1995).
234. Report of the Third Experts Meeting, supra note 9, annex, art. 6 ter(3), at 15;
Report of the Final Experts Meeting, supra note 10, annex I, art. 6 ter(3), at 8.
235. Report of the Final Experts Meeting, supra note 10, annex I, art. 6 ter(4), at 8.




240. See supra notes 135-38 and accompanying text (describing Article 8).
241. Report of the Third Experts Meeting, supra note 9, annex, art. 8(1) (c), at 17; Re-
port of the Final Experts Meeting, supra note 10, annex I, art. 8(1), at 9.
242. Report of the Third Experts Meeting, supra note 9, annex, art. 8(1)(a), at 17; Re-
port of the Final Experts Meeting, supra note 10, annex I, art. 8(1)(a), at 9.
243. Report of the Third Experts Meeting, supra note 9, annex, art. 8(1)(b), at 17;
Repo of the Final Experts Meeting, supra note 10, annex I, art. 8(1)(b), at 10.
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sion is performing functions in an area with the consent of the
parties to an armed conflict, the parties must provide, upon re-
quest, all mine information to the head of the mission as well as
protection where possible 4.2  The second version of Paragraph 2
proposed would require that when an ICRC mission is perform-
ing authorized functions with the consent of the parties, the par-
ties must, upon request, provide protection, to the extent feasi-
ble, as well as mine information. 45 The third version would re-
quire the parties to provide the same safeguards, when
requested, to the head of an impartial humanitarian organiza-
tion that performs consensual functions in the area.24 The pro-
posed Paragraph 3 provides that when a United Nations or other
fact-finding mission performs functions in any area with the con-
sent of the parties, each party must provide feasible protec-
tion. 47 If unable to provide protection, the parties must make
available landmine information in its possession. 48
I. Proposals Regarding Mine Removal
Article 9 concerns the removal of mines.249 The current
version requires parties, after the cessation of active hostilities, to
assist one another in removing or rendering ineffective
minefields. 250 The Final Experts Meeting Report contains two
proposed versions of Article 9. Paragraph 1 of the first proposed
Article 9 would require that parties either remove, destroy, or
maintain all mines, without delay, in areas under their control
after fighting has ceased. 51 If the party no longer has control
over an area where it has laid mines, the party shall provide the
controlling party technical and material assistance so that the
controlling party can fulfill its demining obligations.252 Para-
graph 2 would impose a duty on parties to reach agreement with
other states parties and international organizations, where ap-
propriate, including joint operations and technical and material
244. Report of the Final Experts Meeting, supra note 10, annex I, art. 8(2)(a), at 10.
245. Id. art. 2(b), at 10.
246. Id. art. 2(c), at 11.
247. Id. art. 8(3), at 11.
248. Id.
249. See supra note 139 and accompanying text (describing Article 9).
250. See supra note 139 and accompanying text (describing Article 9).
251. Report of the Final Experts Meeting, supra note 10, annex I, art. 9(1), at 11.
252. Id. art. 9(1)(b), at 11.
1995] 1555
1556 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 18:1526
assistance, to fulfill demining obligations. 53
In the alternative version of Article 9 proposed, dealing with
technological cooperation, mine clearance, and the implemen-
tation of the Landmine Protocol, 54 Paragraphs 1 and 2 would
obligate parties to partake in the exchange of equipment, mate-
rial, and information concerning mine clearance and the imple-
mentation of the Landmine Protocol255 either through the
United Nations, international bodies, or bilaterally.256 The mine
clearance section of Article 9, as proposed in the alternative,
calls for states parties to provide mine clearance information to
the U.N. data bank, and for the United Nations to provide ex-
pert advice and to assist states parties in their- own mine clear-
ance programs. 57 This proposal would impose assistance duties
on states parties and mechanisms for requests for assistance. 58
Two implementation paragraphs would impose a duty on parties
to provide information to the United Nations -concerning imple-
mentation, including the technical requirements for features
like self-destructing mines, and would provide the means to
transfer such information to countries in need of the informa-
tion.259
J. Verification and Compliance Proposals
The current CCW contains no provisions for verification of
compliance by states parties. Some states, including China and
Cuba, oppose any provision for verification at all, and propose a
non-binding transparency resolution.26 ° Other nations, mainly
Western powers including France and Germany, call for precise
verification measures.2 61 France submitted a working paper for
the Second Experts Meeting with proposals for an Article 10 re-
garding "verification of compliance with the provisions," and an
Article 11 regarding "measures to guarantee compliance with
253. Id. art. 9(2), at 12.
254. Id. art. 9 bis, at 12.
255. Id. art. 9 bis(I)-(2), at 12.
256. Id.
257. Id. art. 9 bis(3)-(4), at 12.
258. See supra notes 249-59 and accompanying text (outlining proposals to Article
9).
259. Report of the Final Experts Meeting, supra note 10, annex I, art. 9 bis(7)-(8), at
13.
260. Experts Make "Remarkable Progress" on Mines Ban, supra note 199.
261. Id.
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the Protocol and responsibility for removal of mines." 162
The Final Experts Meeting contains three alternative pro-
posals relating to verification and compliance. Alternative A
promotes transparency and cooperation but does not specifically
provide means for verification or enforcement.2 63 Alternative B
requires parties to protect civilians from landmines, and to vol-
untarily take certain measures toward that end.2 4 Each state
party would also have to provide the Depositary with an annual
report documenting the efforts of that state to protect civilians
from the indiscriminate effects of landmines.2 65 The report
would be distributed upon request to any other state party by the
Depositary. 66 Alternative C is more comprehensive and de-
tailed.267 The proposed Article 10 would establish a Verification
Commission,2 68 and Article 11 would provide mechanisms for
fact-finding missions.2 169 Article 12 would outline procedures for
the Commission to deal with violations, including obligating the
party in violation to remedy the wrong, collective measures in
conformity with international law, and the referral of matters to
the U.N. Security Council.27 °
III. THE AMENDED LANDMINE PROTOCOL WILL FAIL TO
PROTECT CIVILIANS UNLESS IT CONSIDERS HUMANITARIAN
CONCERNS AND THE REAITY OF MODERN
LANDMINE WARFARE
Despite the international law that regulates landmine war-
fare,271 civilians are not adequately protected from the use of
262. Report of the Second Experts Meeting, supra note 63, app. I, arts. 10-11, at 16-17.
263. Report of the Final Experts Meeting, supra note 10, annex I, app. 1, alt. A.
264. Id. alt. B(1).
265. Id. alt. B(2)-(3).
266. Id.
267. Id. alt. C.
268. Id. alt. C, art. 10. Article 10 does not contain a proposal by which the Secre-
tary-General, in certain circumstances, would be authorized to request a convening of
the Verification Commission. Id. The Third Experts Meeting Report did contain such
a provision. Report of the Third Experts Meeting, supra note 9, n.1, at 21.
269. Report of the Final Experts Meeting, supra note 10, annex I, app. 1, alt. C, arts. 10-
11.
270. Id. art. 12.
271. See supra notes 71-139 and accompanying text (describing international law
regulating landmines).
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landmines.272 The international community has made great
strides in recognizing the global landmine crisis and in recogniz-
ing the failure of international law to control the problem. The
Review Conference, however, is in danger of repeating the mis-
takes made by the original convention. The Reports of the Ex-
perts Meetings indicate that, once again, humanitarian concerns
will be given insufficient weight in proportion to military consid-
erations. 273 The proposals aimed at satisfying humanitarian con-
cerns ignore the reality of modern landmine warfare and will fail
to protect civilians from the use of landmines.
A. The Failure of the Landmine Protocol
The Landmine Protocol has been ineffective because it
placed greater emphasis on military considerations than human-
itarian concerns. The failure of the drafters of the Landmine
Protocol to adequately consider humanitarian considerations is
evidenced throughout the document. For example, Article 7 re-
quires the recording of mines that are preplanned.274 The type
of planning this provision refers to rarely occurs in the battle-
field.2 75 By allowing field officers to circumvent the recording
requirement any time they lay mines that are not preplanned,
the Landmine Protocol allows parties to an armed conflict to
avoid the requirement in its entirety.
In addition, Article 4 of the Landmine Protocol allows
landmines to be deployed in populated areas if the mines are
placed in close proximity to a military objective.2 76 A military
272. See supra notes 18-35 and accompanying text (describing magnitude of
landmine crisis.
273. Report of the Final Experts Meeting, supra note 10, annex III, rule 1. Only states
parties to the CCW may be represented at the Review Conference. Id. Representatives
of the ICRC may participate as observers. Id. rule 48. NGOs may only attend certain
public meetings and may make available written contributions concerning matters on
which they have a special competence. Id. rule 49. The United States, recognizing the
valuable expertise that NGOs would contribute to the process of amending the
Landmine Protocol, has argued in favor of granting observer status to NGOs. Vance &
Okun, supra note 13, at 204.
274. CCW, supra note 1, Protocol II, art. 7(1)(a), 1342 U.N.T.S. at 170, 19 I.L.M. at
1532.
275. Carnahan, supra note 28, at 84. "Preplanned" implies a degree more than
"planned," which is arguably a degree more than the planning with which many battle-
field operations are undertaken, especially considering the types of forces committing
the majority of the more egregious uses of landmines. Id.
276. CCW, supra note 1, Protocol II, art. 4(2), 1342 U.N.T.S. at 169, 19 I.L.M. at
1531.
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objective is an object that makes an effective contribution to mil-
itary action and the capture or destruction of which offers a defi-
nite military advantage. 7" Therefore, when an object in the vi-
cinity offers a military advantage, armed forces may place
landmines in populated areas without violating the Landmine
Protocol. The relatively broad definition of "military objective"
allows parties to an armed conflict to place landmines in popu-
lated areas, giving preference to military needs rather than hu-
manitarian costs.
Finally, Article 5(1) allows the use of long-lived remotely de-
livered mines as long as they are accurately recorded."7 ' The
wording of Paragraph 1 ignores the fact that remotely delivered
mines, by their nature, cannot be accurately recorded. 279 Forces
are permitted to produce and deploy long-lived scatterables, de-
spite the fact that such mines are not being accurately recorded.
The recording requirements of Article 7 and Article 5 (1), as
well as the military objective requirement of Article 4, all fail to
affirmatively place a functional duty on military officers. These
provisions reflect the disposition of the drafters of the Landmine
Protocol, who wrote the Landmine Protocol primarily with mili-
tary considerations in mind. In fact, in some instances, the
Landmine Protocol places less restrictions on the use of
landmines than if military forces complied with previously ex-
isting agreements. 280
While some provisions of the Landmine Protocol were actu-
ally directed at humanitarian concerns, their effectiveness has
been undermined by the reality of modem landmine warfare.
The prohibition on the use of landmines that are not directed at
a military objective was an attempt to protect civilians.2 8 1 Simi-
larly, the provision expressly prohibiting the directing of
landmines against the civilian population was aimed at humani-
tarian concerns.282 Like the rest of the Landmine Protocol, how-
277. Id. art. 2(4), 1342 U.N.T.S. at 168, 19 I.L.M. at 1530.
278. Id. art. 5(1)(a)-(b), 1342 U.N.T.S. at 169, 19 I.L.M. at 1531.
279. See supra note 130 (describing difficulties of recording remotely delivered
mines).
280. See supra note 124 (comparing protections of Article 3 of the Landmine Pro-
tocol to Article 51 of the Additional Protocol I).
281. CCW, supra note 1, Protocol II, art. 3(3) (a), 1342 U.N.T.S. at 169, 19 I.L.M. at
1530.
282. CCW, supra note 1, Protocol II, art. 3(2), 1342 U.N.T.S. at 169, 19 I.L.M. at
1530.
19951 1.559
1560 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 18:1526
ever, neither of those provisions has curbed the proliferation of
landmine warfare, nor protected civilians from the effects of
landmines.28 s The parties using the majority of landmines sim-
ply ignore these restrictions. By allowing landmines to be pro-
duced, transferred, and deployed, the Landmine Protocol has
allowed parties to armed conflicts to continue to use landmines
as they see fit.
B. The Impending Failure of the Review Conference
The results of the Reports of the Experts Meetings suggest
that the participants of the Review Conference will make many
of the same mistakes that were made by the drafters of the CCW.
The Review Conference will once again emphasize military con-
siderations.284 Humanitarian concerns are not being weighed
commensurate with military considerations as mandated by cus-
tomary international law."85
The participants of the Experts Meetings have recognized
the failure of the Landmine Protocol. The provisions that have
been proposed in response to that failure, however, demonstrate
a lack of regard for both humanitarian concerns and the reality
of modern landmine warfare. For example, proposed Article 4
will attempt to prevent the use of long-lived mines. Parties will
be forced to use mines that self-destruct, or else comply with ex-
pensive and difficult restrictions.8 6 In theory, this provision will
prevent the widespread use of long-lived mines. In reality,287
however, parties will be allowed to make, stockpile, and use long-
lived mines. Parties who now show little regard for the current
283. See supra notes 18-35 and accompanying text (describing how landmine use
has proliferated and caused great damage to civilians).
284. See supra note 273 (outlining lack of humanitarian representation at Review
Conference).
285. See supra notes 71-75 and accompanying text (explaining how customary in-
ternational law and fundamental principle of proportionality limit permissible methods
of warfare). The Author believes that allowing NGOs greater participation and respon-
sibility in the process of regulating landmine warfare would help satisfy the principle of
proportionality.
286. Report of the Final Experts Meeting, supra note 10, annex I, art. 4, at 5. The
restrictions require parties using mines that are not self-destructing to fence, monitor,
and mark such minefields. Id.
287. The idea that parties to armed conflicts will fence, monitor, and mark their
minefields is optimistic. SeeJefferson, supra note 3, at 105. "[T]he defined minefield is
a comparatively rare and ideal situation." Id. The forces that engage in the bulk of
landmine warfare deploy landmines "haphazardly and without marking." Id.
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Landmine Protocol will show the same disregard for the
amended Landmine Protocol and will have the option of using
long-lived landmines.
In addition, the proposed Article 3, like Article 3 of the cur-
rent Landmine Protocol,"'8 allows the use of landmines that may
be expected to cause incidental injury to civilians if the expected
damage is not excessive to the anticipated military advantage.28 9
Such language symbolizes the international community's mani-
fest lack of consideration for humanitarian concerns. Besides
permitting the use of landmines expected to harm civilians, 290
the proposed Article 3 lets military leaders use a balancing test to
determine the legality of landmine use. By including this provi-
sion in the proposals for the amended Landmine Protocol, the
drafters have undermined the effectiveness of a regulation
designed to prevent the indiscriminate use of landmines.
Controlling the global landmine crisis by tightening restric-
tions on the use of mines failed in the original Landmine Proto-
col. Military leaders do not consider these international agree-
ments when making decisions in the field of combat. The mere
tightening of restrictions in the amended Landmine Protocol
will again fail to protect civilians from the practical reality of mil-
itary forces abusing loopholes, ignoring restrictions, and contin-
uing to use landmines in a manner that adversely affects civil-
ians.
C. A Total Ban Is the Only Solution
Rather than placing restrictions on the choices made by mil-
itary forces, the problem must be addressed at its root. In order
to prevent the damage inflicted upon civilians by landmines, ef-
forts must be made to eliminate the availability of landmines for
military use. To do so would require the imposition of a ban on
the use, production, stockpiling, and transfer of landmines, com-
bined with an effective verification and compliance mechanism.
Even if made completely illegal, some countries may pro-
duce and use landmines. There are two distinctions, however,
288. CCW, supra note 1, Protocol II, art. 3(3)(c), 1342 U.N.T.S. at 169, 19 I.L.M. at
1530.
289. Report of the Final Experts Meeting, supra note 10, annex I, art. 3(6)(c), at 4.
290. See supra note 124 and accompanying text (explaining how balancing test al-
lows landmine warfare violating Article 51(4) of Additional Protocol I).
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that set a total ban apart from measures that merely tighten re-
strictions. The first is that a total ban would be more easily and
effectively enforced than a partial one.291 A breach of a total ban
would be evident29 2 and would subject parties having, using,
making, or selling landmines to sanctions and international
pressure to comply.2 93 For such a stigma to be effective, it must
be attached to the weapon itself. The stigma would lose its effec-
tiveness if certain types of landmine use were permitted, while
others were prohibited.24
The second distinction is that there would be no room for
judgment in interpreting a total ban. As the failure of the
Landmine Protocol has shown,295 restrictions are often ignored
on the battlefield. Experience has demonstrated that when par-
ties have access to landmines, they use them in abundance, ig-
noring the complex restrictions on use.2 6
A total ban will not make landmines impossible to make,
buy, or use. Such a ban would, however, increase the costs of
using landmines, both monetarily, and politically, in terms of
dealing with the international stigma associated with violating a
treaty aimed at humanitarian objectives. These increased costs
would result in decreased deployment of landmines. Fewer
landmines deployed would harm fewer civilians.
D. The Militaiy Utility of Landmines Does Not Preclude a Total Ban
Military leaders believe that landmines are essential to their
strategies and objectives.2 97 Commentators have expressed res-
ervations about the viability of a control measure that would con-
flict directly with the express convictions of the military commu-
nity. 298 The lack of interest by military leaders in curbing
291. Anderson Testimony, supra note 7.
292. Vance & Okun, supra note 13, at 207.
293. LANDMINES: A DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 37, at 12. Attaching a stigma to the
use of chemical and biological weapons, which are considered repugnant by the inter-
national community, has reduced the use of such weapons. Id.; see supra note 270 and
accompanying text (giving example of sanctions and international pressure to comply).
294. Id.
295. See supra notes 18-35 and accompanying text (establishing that civilians have
not been protected).
296. LA.NDMINEs: A DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 37, at 12.
297. ICRC Report, supra note 10, annex II. This conclusion may be debatable, but it
must be accepted as the military view. See supra note 42 (questioning military utility of
landmines).
298. Falk, supra note 6, at 82.
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landmine use helps to explain why partial bans have failed in the
past and will continue to fail in the future, but does not mean
that a total ban cannot succeed. By precluding countries from
having, making, using, or selling landmines, a total ban would
take the power to violate such a treaty out of the hands of the
military leaders who are prone to violating its provisions. If they
cannot obtain landmines, military leaders will not be able to use
the devices.
Military utility alone does not satisfy the inquiry into the le-
gality of a weapon. Dum-dum bullets299 and chemical and bio-
logical warfare were both systems of warfare with military utility
that were banned.3 ° ° Customary international law necessitates a
balancing test between military utility and humanitarian costs. 0
With landmines, the issue of military utility may be debatable,
but the issue of humanitarian costs is not. The loss has been
quantifiably measured in terms of human lives and econom-
ics. 302 Military leaders oppose a total ban because they want to
have the option of using landmines. The cost of that option is
that landmines are available for use throughout the world, kill-
ing and maiming civilians.
E. A Total Ban Is Viable
Cornelio Sommagura, president of the ICRC, was told that
the idea of a total ban was a utopian ideal.303 Indeed, many of
the opponents of a total ban believe that it is not a viable option
because the influential people do not consider a total ban a real-
istic option. While this may have been the case until recently,
the momentum toward a total ban on landmines has increased
substantially in the past few years, and includes a number of
highly respected persons and organizations. Secretary-General
Boutros Boutros-Ghali has written several articles, which advo-
299. See supra note 78 and accompanying text (describing prohibition of bullets
that expand upon contact with soft surface).
300. LANDMINES: A DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 37, at 314. The relative success of
international law in controlling chemical and biological weapons may be due to the fact
that it was accomplished via a total ban. Id.
301. See supra notes 71-75 and accompanying text (explaining how customary in-
ternational law and fundamental principal of proportionality limit methods of warfare).
302. See supra notes 18-27 and accompanying text (describing humanitarian and
economic costs of use of landmines).
303. Sheridan, supra note 174.
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cate a total ban. °4 South African Archbishop Desmond Tutu
has stated that a total ban is the only sure way to save lives from
landmines3° and has called on the countries of Africa to sup-
port such a measure.3 16 Senator Patrick Leahy [D-Vt.], former
Chairman of the Senate Foreign Security Council, has been a
vocal proponent of a total ban. 0 7 Senator Leahy's efforts have
been instrumental in pushing the United States to its current
position on landmines. 308 Representative Lane Evans [D-I1.] has
also played a large role in the U.S. efforts. 30 9 Former U.S. Presi-
dentJimmy Carter has officially endorsed the efforts of the NGO
campaign to totally ban landmines,3 1 0 and former U.S. Secretary
of State Cyrus Vance has testified before Congress about the
need for the United States to lead the way in obtaining a global
ban on the use of landmines s l
The popular cry for the total ban of landmines cannot be
ignored. Twenty years ago, few people were aware of the dam-
age resulting from landmines. Today, journalists' coverage of
landmine damage around the globe have heightened the pub-
lic's awareness. As one Australian arms control diplomat stated,
while the 1980's was the decade to control chemical weapons
globally, the 1990's is the decade for landmines. 3 12 The princi-
ples of customary international law have successfully banned
weapons in the past when their harm to civilians outweighed
their military utility.3 1 3 Landmines are such a weapon,3 14 and
thus the international community should implement a total ban.
304. See supra notes 183-86 and accompanying text (describing role of Secretary-
General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in fight to ban landmines).
305. Zimbabwe; South African Bishop Calls for ban on Land Mines, BBC Summary of
World Broadcasts, Mar. 4, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.
306. Id.
307. See supra note 154 (citing letter to editor of New York Times by Senator Leahy
concerning need to ban landmines).
308. Anderson testimony, supra note 7.
309. Id.
310. ILANDMINs: A DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 37, app. 16, at 460.
311. Prepared Statement of Cyrus R. Vance and Herbert A. Okun Before the Foreign Opera-
tions Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee, supra note 38.
312. Warren Osmond, Australia Pushes for Landmine Controls, Sydney Morning Her-
ald, Feb. 26, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.
313. See St. Petersburg Declaration, supra note 76 (banning type of bullet); see
1925 Geneva Protocol, supra note 87 (banning chemical weapons).
314. See supra note 110 and accompanying text (discussing how international law
prohibits modern use of landmines).
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CONCLUSION
The current Landmine Protocol tightened restrictions on
the use of landmines, but nonetheless failed to control the
global landmine crisis. In response to the global landmine crisis,
the Governmental Experts Meetings have proposed amend-
ments to the Landmine Protocol that will tighten restrictions on
the use of landmines. Based on the Reports of these Meetings,
the U.N. Review Conference will not adopt a total ban on the
production, use, transfer, and stockpiling of landmines. Mere
restrictions on the use of landmines, however, fail to safeguard
civilians. In order to protect civilians, the international commu-
nity must impose a ban on the manufacture, use, transfer, and
stockpiling of landmines, coupled with an effective verification
and compliance scheme.
